Author(s):
|
Morris, Ian |
URL:
|
http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/morris/120511.pdf |
Format:
|
Article |
Publisher:
|
Department of Classics, Princeton University |
Publication City:
|
Princeton |
Date:
|
2005 |
Source:
|
Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics |
"In this paper I examine the “bargaining hypothesis” about democracy by calculating nd political participation ratios in Greece (MPR and PPR). I find that high (>10%) MPR coincided with high PPR, but was only one path toward state formation. Except in extreme situations like the Persian invasion of 480, high MPR and PPR depended on specific patterns of capital accumulation and concentration. In situations of high capital concentration rulers could substitute high spending for high MPR and PPR, preserving desirable social arrangements. Through time, the importance of capital concentrations grew. War made states and states made war in ancient Greece, as in early-modern Europe, but in different ways."
Permalink: |
http://etana.org/node/8894 |